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Comments
I'm a transhumanist in the "cyborgs are awesome" sense. I do totally agree with the brain-uploading thing and the singularity thing, by-the-way.
Sure, that is in no way what you're talking about, but it was your choice to start using labels.
This thread should instead be; "Why brain-uploading is unscientific."
^^ Good article. Thanks for sharing.
^ I renamed it to something more appropriate.
Internet debates about extropianism -- the only place you'll ever hear the term "extropianism".
^ Which is a good thing, as we know that they are probably never going to be anything more than an annoying fringe group.
Worth noting is that Vernor Vinge COINED the term "singularity", still considers it merely a thought experiment and even he's weirded out by some of the thinking the topic has spawned.
So I see I can agree with Vinge here. I mean, all these Internet nerds who buy that, they seem to believe it works like this:
1) invent an AI
2) ???
3) I BE GOD
Like, as if the existence of a computer you can have a conversation with means the laws of physics are suddenly reduced to, like, optional footnotes.
Only transhumanist I'm familiar with is the guy who writes Dresden Codak. So uh, no comments here other than why did you write the OP as if it were addressed to everyone reading it?
Are you talking about this:
Or this?
Regardless, I sometimes write parts of essays/posts like this one like I'm talking to some indefinite person because the alternative would look awkward.
Either or. I dunno just struck me as odd.
But I have nothing to really add to this conversation, so y'all can carry on. I'll go back to watching my animoo.
Meh, it's just a stylistical thing.
I doubt brain uploading will ever happen but I don't think your counterargument is nearly as strong as you think at is.
In fact, brain uploading doesn't rely on dualism at all. It relies on your mind being information stored in your brain; that is to say it relies on MATERIALISM being true. If you had a soul there's no way to upload that to a physical object.
Now, strong monism of the sort that you're not just information in your brain, you are literally your brain itself would indeed mean brain uploading is impossible, but that's no more supported by science then "information within the brain" is.
Impossible in our life times? Probably. Impossible in the long run? No way to know yet
^^ Hmm, that's a very sound argument, I'll give you that.
But I believe that the mind is far more than simple information stored in your brain. In fact, I believe that, in a sense, we, as in, out biological selves, are our minds. Our brains function dynamically, and are constantly affected by internal and external stimuli, bodily chemicals etc. The information stored within our brain is only a part of a wider network that rules our mental processes; this may be a kinda weak analogy, but saying that uploading the information stored within our brain to an artificial body would completely upload our "selves" into it would be like copying all files from your old computer to a new one and saying that you are still using your old computer.
The point is that information in the brain, independent of other factors, is passive and thus can't produce consciousness, as consciousness requires stimuli and an active understanding of the world. Some mental traits are determined by genetics - again, biology. There's much, much more.
The reason why the idea of brain uploading dualistic is because it assumes that cognitive processes are independent of biological processes (false), which again creates the dissonance between the material and the mental.
^ It's as much a question of technology as it is a question of philosophy and the nature of the human mind and consciousness.
^In theory, the solution to that would be to just replicate and/or gradually replace the entire body.
I say in theory because accomplishing that assumes the discovery of technology that runs on wishes.
I don't really see how brain damage is an argument against the existence of souls. If we posit that there is some kind of eternal soul which is the basis of our mind, personality and rationality then the brain is simply a tool which translates this into a form which is usable in the physical world. It's kind of like how a television can receive a signal from somewhere, which is then the true origin of what you see on the screen. However if one just naively looks at the screen one might think that the screen is in fact the source of what is being conveyed. In the same sense one might naively think that the brain is the source of our selves, rather than simply a tool which can receive and translate the soul. If this tool breaks down, obviously the reception and decrypting of the soul breaks down and we get things like Alzheimer's disease.
Not saying that this is the case (I really don't know if we have a soul or not), just that I'm not entirely convinced by your opening reductionist statements.
Though it should be noted that in terms of natural science, the postulation of an immortal soul is indeed not scientific. After all it is pretty much a completely untestable hypothesis, meaning that it can't really be falsified.
^ Well, it's untestable insofar as ghosts are
Unfortunately, there's the tricky issue of the goal posts constantly moving
I'm willing to argue under the assumption that there isn't a soul as transhumanist wank fuel tends to fall apart just as easily on their own terms.
Like, best case scenario you'd create an AI that thinks it's you while the real you is still sitting around in your brainpan. Even under assumptions of weak monism all you're doing is making a copy of information.
Though, assuming that it's possible to create a perfectly functioning artificial replica of a biological body and all its processes, it also raises the question of could your consciousness be preserved in a replica body. We don't yet know what consciousness is, exactly, and what processes govern it, but it's most probably a very complex phenomenon that can't be boiled down to passive memory storage.
Hmmm. Still, a "soul" or a "mind" is supposed to be the sole source of our personality and mental qualities, and it's been proven that information is physically stored in the brain. If that's the case, it kinda invalidates the whole point of a transcendental soul, does it?
And even if we take the existence of a Cartesian mind as granted, can something that exists only in the transcendental, idealistic sense really be uploaded into a machine? Even computer data operates in the form of electrical signals.
From the point of view of the computer, you would be. Or well, you'd be using your "old computer" with all the hardware replaced, but otherwise you would be.
No, under the assumptions of weak monism that IS you. ALL copies of the information in your brain are you. Even if there is more than one of them, they are all still you, because you are exactly the information stored in your brain and nothing more.
Yes this is weird. But it's not inconsistent, just unintuitive, so that's not a counterargument.
It just considers all your thought processes, memories and such to be what makes up 'you', not your body.
It is a copy of you. It is not specifically you. Unless you are actively sharing thought processes with that copy, it's not your instance of you. In fact, the moment it's created, it starts having experiences that you don't -- so within seconds, it's not really even a copy of you either.
Not really. It depends on what you think 'you' are, again. You don't have to be limited to one mind, one body, etc; at least, to some people.
To some, for all intents and purposes, a copy of you which shared all your experiences, emotions, thought patters, etc, is you, as there is no meaningful differences. There is simply you, shared among two instances.
Gah, my head hurts now.
Except as soon as it starts existing independently, it's now building its own set of experiences, emotions, and thought patterns. At the very latest, from the moment you turn it on, it stops being you in any meaningful sense.
Not really. 'You' aren't just a sum of thoughts, experiences and everything.
Except that's the whole fucking basis of it counting as you!
Either you are a replicatable collection of thoughts, memories, and experiences, or you aren't. If you aren't, the copy never counted. If you are, it stopped counting at t>0 if it even did in the first place.
Or, it's you in that it's you, being defined as something "you" and having the basis of your mind.
That is; it depends on if someone defines 'you' as something that can be measured/defined/whatever, or if it's a concept that can be applied to any instance of you, even if that instance continues to grow outside of the first instance.
The concept of "your instance of you" is meaningless. It's you, it continues being you. You can have multiple different "you"s at the same time having multiple different experiences; none of them is the single real "you" and so none of them are "copies".
I realize this is terribly unintuitive, but again: weird, not inconsistent.
Basically, what he said.